II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: AN OCEAN BETWEEN US
A. LEGISLATION
United Kingdom
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 (HFE Act) forms the basis for all U.K. legislation regarding fertility clinics and embryo research. 9 It describes the functions and procedure of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), the conditions requiring licensing for fertility clinics and related research, and specific regulations governing the creation, storage or use of human gametes and embryos. 10 Significantly, the HFE Act authorized the formation of the HFEA, the first statutory body of its kind in the world. It grants the HFEA several general functions, outlined in the 2004 HFEA annual report.
11
The HFEA is primarily responsible for the licensing and monitoring of clinics that perform IVF, donor insemination and/or human embryo research, and the regulation of gamete and embryo storage.
12
In addition, the HFEA produced a Code of Practice with guidelines on licensed activities 13 and keeps a register of information on donors, treatments, and children born through ART.
14 It also publicizes its role, gives advice and information, and reviews new developments in the field. 15 
United States
Those scholars advocating a U.S. shift to a U.K. model offer only a brief, disparaging account of U.S. legislation regarding fertility clinics and embryo research. 16 This reflects the fact that no comprehensive policy governs ART in the U.S. The law that most closely parallels the HFE Act is the U.S. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRCA). 17 The FCSRCA mandates that infertility clinics submit ART success rate data and describes the responsibilities of the CDC in regard to data reporting and licensing. 18 Specifically, the CDC must (1) publish annual success rates for pregnancies achieved via ART technology, and (2) develop a model program for the licensing of embryo laboratories for adoption by the states. 19 The FCSRCA legislation, however, does not go nearly as far as the 9 See generally Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). 10 Id. § § 3-15. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, supra note 5. 15 
Id.

16
See, e.g., Burchell, supra note 1, at 139-42 (describing federal regulation of embryonic stem cell research in the U.S. as inconsistent and contradictory); Childress, supra note 1, at 162-63 (contrasting the U.K.'s "strict regulation of reproductive technologies" with the "limited and uneven" regulation in the U.S.). But see PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 1, at 47-50 (discussing extensively current regulation of ART). Id. § § 263a-2(a)(1), 263a-5(1)(A).
LESSONS ACROSS THE POND 423 HFE Act. It fails to give the CDC the authority to enforce the data-reporting requirement, and simply outlines a voluntary system of licensing that has not been implemented or enforced. 20 The States have been more active than the federal government in using legislation to regulate the use of human embryos. State activity appears minimal, however, when contrasted with HFEA's oversight. Some states have regulated the use of human embryos for research purposes; others have banned human cloning.
21
No state has created an agency with powers like the HFEA or regulated ART in any other significant manner.
22
B. DATA REPORTING
United Kingdom
The HFEA began collecting data in a register of information on August 1, 1991. 23 Its registry is now the largest of its type in the world. 24 The HFEA maintains data on everyone who receives ART treatment, donates embryos, or is born through ART in licensed British fertility clinics. 25 The HFEA updated its register in 1998, and now provides non-confidential ART success rate data on its website. 26 In order to ensure data reliability, the HFEA implemented a five-year auditing program.
27
Over the course of the program, which ran from October 1996 until January 2002, the HFEA audited data from 106 licensed clinics. 28 The HFEA is presently engaged in a large strategic project to improve the Register, 29 which holds data on cycles of licensed treatments, following a review that identified technical problems and challenged the rigor of the data. 30 In addition to using data to monitor treatments and provide information, the HFEA maintains a confidential registry of information for the sake of children born from ART treatment.
33
Its registry includes patient and partner names, patient reference numbers, treatment dates, and details of sperm and egg donors. 34 This personal information is kept confidential except for children over the age of 18 (or over 16 if they are going to marry), who may be told whether or not they were born via ART. 35 In this way, the HFEA aims to ward off a situation where two people marry without knowing that they are genetically related.
United States
In the U.S., the process of data collection demands a thorough review. U.S. law 36 requires clinics to submit ART success rate data for publication by the CDC, but the process is essentially voluntary and non-reporting clinics suffer little or no consequences.
From 1992 to 2004, the responsibility for data collection rested largely on the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), 37 a private organization of ART clinical programs and an affiliate of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM). 38 SART has been keeping an ART success rate database since 1986.
39 Although the CDC took over publishing ART success rate reports in 1995,
40
SART remained the driving force behind the CDC's publications. SART is individually incorporated for tax purposes, but SART members are meant to be ASRM members also. 41 Clinics that join SART pay a $300 yearly membership fee, a $500 registry fee for data collection services, and additional 31 Id.
32
FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 9. 33 Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. The homepage for SART is located at http://www.sart.org/home.html.
38
ASRM is a professional society.
The homepage for the ASRM is located at http://www.asrm.org. 43 SART members must receive inspection and accreditation by an outside agency every two years, and must meet all SART/ASRM ethical practice, laboratory and advertising guidelines. 44 In 2004, the CDC announced a change in its data collection contractor and in approved data reporting systems for [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . It contracted with Westat to perform the services previously performed by SART under Westat's web-based National ART Surveillance System (NASS). 45 Even under the CDC's contract with Westat, SART members may continue to enter their data into the SART system.
46
SART then transfers its data into the Westat system so that clinics maintain compliance with the federal mandate. 47 The CDC has not yet published a report based on the Westat data.
Regardless of whether they are SART members or not, federal law requires all ART clinics to report and verify ART success rate data annually. 48 Unlike the U.K., where data collection is simply a part of the licensing process, data collection in the U.S. is its own entity. To complete the process, clinics must submit verified data about every ART cycle performed and maintain medical records in their own files for validation purposes. The CDC has sought to make clear that it maintains "ultimate authority" over the validation process and the annual report. 52 It explained its decision to contract with SART for data collection and validation as follows:
CDC's authority to publish and disseminate the annual report is not being ceded to SART, but rather SART is serving as a valuable resource from which CDC can obtain the necessary information to fulfill its statutory obligation . . . . Prior to the decision to partner with SART, CDC reviewed the SART reporting database and system and found that it provided the necessary information to publish an annual report as required by FCSRCA. Rather than duplicate SART's reporting system and thereby burden ART clinics, CDC has contracted with SART to annually obtain a copy of their clinic specific database.
53
The CDC offered no explanation when it awarded the data collection contract to Westat in 2004. 54 Our discussion will focus on data collected by SART since the agency has not yet published a report based on data collected by Westat.
Every clinic that reported data for the first CDC report (1995) was a SART member. 55 Over time, however, the percentage of non-SART members reporting data to SART has increased. Six percent (6%) of clinics that reported data in the CDC's 2000 data report 56 were not SART members. This likely reflects efforts by both the CDC and SART to include all existing clinics in the report. In the CDC's recent CDC 2002 data report, 8.7% of clinics were not SART members.
57
Since the start of the CDC/SART joint reporting effort in 1995, a high percentage of all programs in the U.S. providing ART services have submitted data on procedures performed in their practices. 58 In 1999, 370 of the 399 listed clinics, or 92.7%, reported verified data.
59, 60
The number of non-reporting clinics documented by the CDC has decreased from 30 of 390 in 1998, to 29 trend, a significant cohort of programs continues to defy the law by not reporting verified ART success rates. For instance, eight of the non-reporting clinics in 1999 were also listed as non-reporting in 1998, and four of the eight were listed as nonreporting in 1997 as well. 64, 65, 66 Nearly half of the 25 non-reporting clinics in 2000 also did not report data in 1999. 67, 68 One clinic, The Genetics & IVF Institute (GIVF) of Fairfax, VA, was listed as non-reporting in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. 69, 70, 71, 72, 73 This is especially disturbing because GIVF is a particularly large and well-known clinic. They have received national attention for pioneering the "Micro sort," sperm-sorting technology 74 and advertise nationally on the Google search engine and in the New York Times Magazine. 75 The long list of non-reporting clinics (and an increasing number of repeat nonreporters) in the CDC's annual report illustrates the essentially voluntary nature of data-reporting, even when it is mandated by federal law. According to Richard J. Sherins, M.D., director of the GIVF Division of Andrology (Male Infertility), a number of factors may lead a clinic to not report ART success rates. These include the lack of solid criteria to correctly identify the etiology of infertility, an imprecise separation of clinical indications, and the inherent bias in the reporting structure toward pregnancy rates as the sole arbiter of a clinic's success (even though other criteria may be useful to the public as they choose an ART clinic). 76 In fact, being listed as a non-reporting clinic in the CDC's annual report is the only consequence for failing to report ART success rate data. 77 Moreover, the CDC gives only a vague reference to those clinics that fail to report data but are not listed in the CDC report at all, even as non-reporting. 78 According to the CDC, their report includes "almost all" clinics that used ART in the year covered by the report. 79 The list of ART clinics has grown with each annual report, 80 previously been listed as operating ART programs. However, the fact that the list of non-reporting clinics begins with a request that consumers contact the CDC if they know of any clinics missing from the report, leads one to conjecture that enforcement is inconsistent at both the non-reporting and inclusion levels.
C. LICENSING 1. United Kingdom According to the HFE Act, the HFEA has the authority to license British fertility clinics and research laboratories using gametes or human embryos. 81 The HFE Act clearly sets out three licensing categories: licenses for fertility treatment, licenses for embryo storage, and licenses for research on human embryos or gametes.
82 Section 1 of Schedule 2 specifies that clinics require a license to create embryos in vitro, store embryos, use human gametes, test embryos before implantation, implant embryos in a woman, test sperm viability, or conduct research on human embryos or gametes. 83 None of these practices require a license in the U.S.
Importantly, the HFE Act 84 authorizes the HFEA to enforce the licensing requirements. The HFEA has the authority to refuse, revoke, or suspend a license and to submit violators of the HFE Act to the Director of Public Prosecutions. 85 Those convicted of license violations may be charged with a prison term of up to ten years and a fine. 86 For less serious cases, the HFEA may issue a license, contingent upon a clinic meeting certain HFEA conditions or completing a review. 87 At the very least, the licensing process allows for the HFEA to make recommendations to improve clinic practices without issuing conditions or revoking a clinic's license. 88 The U.K. Parliament also retains some power over the licensing process, most notably in regard to licenses for research on human embryos. In a recent and wellpublicized case, Parliament used its power to extend the HFEA's ability to grant licenses for embryo research. 89 Before the decision by Parliament, the HFEA could issue a license for research on embryos or gametes only for the study of infertility, congenital disease, miscarriages, contraception techniques, or pre-implantation testing for genetic abnormalities. 90 As of January 2001, the HFEA can issue licenses for research on embryo development or "serious disease," or for the treatment of serious disease. 91 LESSONS ACROSS THE POND 429 for research on "serious disease" essentially allowed for the first legal stem cell research in the U.K. 92 In terms of process, a research program must first obtain approval from a Research Ethics Committee (equivalent to Institutional Review Boards in North America) before applying for a license from the HFEA. 93 It must then submit an application explaining the objectives and protocols of the study, why the study requires the use of human gametes or embryos, and why the study is necessary. 94 Completed applications are peer reviewed and returned to the applicant for comments before the license committee reviews them. 95 For successful applications, the HFEA conducts inspections and reviews progress reports and a final report.
96
The 2003-2004 HFEA Annual Report includes a list of licensed research projects and a list of peer reviewers. 97 The HFEA granted research licenses to 124 of 156 applicants between 1991 and August 31, 2004 . 98 The majority of these were research licenses for the treatment of infertility. 99 It will be interesting to see how the make-up of licensed research projects changes given the availability of licenses for the study of "serious disease."
The process of licensing programs for the creation or storage of embryos differs slightly from the process of licensing for research. 100 Recently, the HFEA began to issue three-year treatment and storage licenses in response to the growing number of well-established fertility clinics that had demonstrated consistent adherence to the Code of Practice. 101 For licensed clinics, a full inspection takes place every third year prior to license renewal, and interim inspections take place during the other two years. These changes demonstrate the HFEA's efforts to save time and make the licensing process more cost-effective.
United States
While licensing has become well established and even streamlined in the U.K., no U.S. law requires licensing or accreditation of ART programs or embryo laboratories. Though SART conducted verification site visits as part of its data reporting process, the inspections have no connection to licensing or accreditation.
102
SART members must submit evidence that they have received accreditation to fulfill their membership requirements, but an approved outside agency and not SART itself grants accreditation.
103 Non-SART members have no obligation to SART or the CDC to receive such accreditation. includes standards for quality assurance, personnel competency, and record keeping, the CDC cannot require clinics to meet these standards in practice. As of July 2005, no state had adopted the CDC's program.
106
Since no state has implemented the model certification program, it is impossible for any clinic to obtain certification according to the CDC's standards. Therefore, as a public service, the CDC has decided to document accreditation by the College of American Pathologists (CAP), the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), and the New York State Tissue Bank Accreditation Program (NYSTB) in its annual success rate report.
107 These three organizations provide accreditation of the laboratories, and the clinic is responsible for the data reporting procedures described previously.
108 These are nonfederal programs that the CDC does not oversee, and they are also the three accreditation programs approved by SART.
109
In the U.S., ART clinics may use multiple embryology laboratories.
According to the CDC's 2002 report, 92% of 391 reporting clinics had accreditation from CAP, JCAHO, or the NYSTB, with accreditation pending for an additional 4% of clinics.
110 This is a significant increase from just four years prior, when only 67% of 360 reporting clinics had accreditation from any of the three agencies, with accreditation pending for an additional 8% of clinics.
111
Unlike in the U.K., there are no legal consequences for non-accredited U.S. programs. In addition, there is also "no consumer-recognized seal of approval or standard symbol that conveys that any minimum standards of quality have been met."
112 The rapid increase in accreditation since White's 1998 analysis depicts the changing landscape of the decentralized U.S. regulatory system; driven by commercial success and consumer behavior, the ART clinics have responded to the increasingly informed and educated consumer, a response not previously generated by unenforced federal mandates.
The newly educated consumer should not be viewed as a coincidental byproduct of increasingly widespread internet use. In 2000, SART began a public relations campaign called "Setting the Standards for ART." The campaign press release acknowledged SART's intent to create an image of SART as the guardian of quality 113 The campaign sought to raise consumer confidence in dealing with fertility clinics belonging to SART and to increase recognition of the fact that SART members adhere to strict membership standards. SART hopes that the label "SART member" will convey a message of quality and safety to consumers. This message is appropriate since SART members must have accreditation from at least one of CAP, JCAHO, or the NYSTB.
114
Of course, the quality and safety of an accredited fertility clinic or embryo laboratory depends upon the standards of the accrediting agency. Since CAP accredits the majority of accredited programs listed in the 2002 CDC report, it is imperative that CAP set strict standards for accreditation. CAP has published its standards, which include specifications regarding lab directors, personnel, facilities, inspections and quality assurance. 115 Specifically, CAP requires the lab director to have appropriate education and experience with relevant procedures. 116 CAP also required that personnel, resources, and facilities correspond to the size of the program.
117 CAP conducts periodic on-site inspections and clinics supplement this with self-inspections. 118 Clinics must correct any deficiencies and report any corrective action taken. 119 In addition, clinics must put in place an ongoing quality assurance program to evaluate quality of care, analyze data as a method of quality control, and complete proficiency testing.
120
CAP's program does not differ significantly from the HFEA's licensing program in these standards, which also includes specific requirements, on-site inspections, evaluations, and recommendations for improvement.
121
The general process of licensing and accreditation is roughly the same for the two organizations, although specific regulatory differences exist. The key difference is that British law requires licensing, while U.S. clinics choose to seek accreditation voluntarily.
D. REGULATION
United Kingdom
Programs applying for licensing from the HFEA must comply with both the HFE Act and the most recent edition of the Code of Practice.
122
Both documents describe acceptable and unacceptable practices for infertility treatment and embryo research in the U.K. 123 Restrictions and prohibitions are clearly stated, and are subjected to HFEA revision and review. 124 126 The Act serves as the basis for the HFEA's continual evaluation of developments in the field.
The HFEA addresses the policy issues raised by changes in ART in frequent updates and its annual report looks forward to key issues expected in the upcoming year. For instance, the Policy Update for the HFEA 2002 Annual Report 127 offers background information and HFEA policy on pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), tissue typing within PGD to identify embryos that are "tissue compatible" with an existing child, aneuploidy screening, embryo transfer, donor information, the Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001, Intrea-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI), and stem cells from human embryos. The HFEA's decisions on these issues have primary importance to British infertility programs, since in many cases the HFEA has the authority to grant or deny licenses for novel treatments, such as PGD or egg freezing.
The HFEA's regulatory reach on policy issues has a direct impact on choices available to British citizens seeking procreative options. For example, the HFEA permits couples to use technology to conceive a child who is genetically appropriate for use as an organ donor for an older sibling, 128 but does not allow couples to use IVF to conceive triplets. 
United States
No regulatory agency in the U.S. has as comprehensive a list of policy issues to evaluate as in the U.K., and most of these issues-with the exception of cloning and gamete, embryo and tissue storage-lack federal regulation all together. The existing regulation in the U.S. focuses on quality control. The FDA oversees clinical studies of new medicines, but has asserted "jurisdiction over human cells used in therapy involving the transfer of genetic material by means other than the union of gamete nuclei." 130 As discussed above, the CDC oversees the task of gathering and publishing data on ART success rates.
131
States discipline fertility specialists for using unscrupulous practices.
132
Regulation on sensitive policy matters concerning ART is virtually nonexistent at a federal level. Debate rages in Congress about appropriate regulation of stem cell research for therapeutic purposes, but almost no debate exists about regulating assisted reproduction. The lack of regulation at the federal level is a direct result of U.S. emphasis on personal autonomy and the sanctity of privacy. These rights make it difficult for states to issue restrictive policies on ART. 133 Furthermore, the political stakes surrounding the volatile issue of abortion in the U.S. cause reluctance by policy makers to deal with issues regarding human embryos created through ART.
134
Sovereignty complications also arise, with some issues requiring attention on the state level. 135 Several scholars offer excellent accounts of the legal status of ART in the U.S.
136
Havins and Dalessio describe the relevant constitutional protections, statutory protections, federal and state regulations and court rulings. 137 This body of legislation and court cases demonstrate that regulations on ART lack consistency and are rarely well developed in any particular state. For example, Havins and Dalessio point out that Louisiana is the only state with a law regarding the destruction of frozen embryos (destruction is forbidden), an issue that is clearly regulated by the HFEA. 138 Often, U.S. law fails to reflect important distinctions in biological techniques and fails to match the rapid pace at which reproductive technologies are developing, a challenge met by the HFEA.
The private capitalistic health care system further drives the lack of regulation. Given the important role SART plays in data reporting and in requiring accreditation among its members, one might expect SART to contribute to the creation of policy in the U.S. SART, however, is committed to self-regulation of ART and embryo labs. 139 One SART slogan states that "prevention is the best medicine" with regard to government regulation. 140 Indeed, SART's campaign to represent the highest standards in ART demonstrates an effort to maintain regulatory control, while simultaneously improving the quality of infertility programs and research. SART members value their ability to individualize their patient treatment depending on the specific circumstances. They fear government regulation would limit their flexibility in utilizing innovative ART procedures and techniques, thereby compromising patient care and access. 141 143 The clinics objecting to the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction explained that "cytoplasm is not a drug," that the FDA was interfering with the doctor patient relationship, and that the FDA's intervention would compromise future health benefits by "imposing an unnecessary restraint on the process of medical science." 144 SART, however, is not an accrediting agency itself and has no control over nonmembers. Indeed, the greatest punishment that SART can impose on its own members is to revoke their membership status. 145 This does nothing to improve the quality of a clinic for which membership status is not important. SART recognizes these limitations on its ability to make changes in the field and attempts to overcome them by working closely with government agencies and continually recruiting new members.
146 But SART alone cannot deal with the problems of poor-quality clinics and practices.
Without regulation, certain problems will continue to plague the field of ART and embryo research in the U.S. The problems include:
• Poor quality clinics will remain open and will propagate morally questionable and/or sloppy clinical practices, whether on purpose or unintentionally. Some of these cases will make headlines while others will go unpublicized.
• The availability, reliability, and clarity of ART success rate data will continue to be poor so that consumers will have difficulty determining the quality of individual clinics.
• Clinics that "cut corners" on voluntary data reporting, advertising, and practice guidelines will achieve commercial success at the expense of better quality clinics with whom they compete.
• Poor quality clinics will harm the reputation of the field of ART as a whole. These problems demand attention through governmental regulation or other means. The goal of any such regulation must be to get rid of low-quality clinics, improve available ART success rate data for consumers, and eliminate morally questionable and sloppy practices. Lorio adds that regulations are necessary to ensure safety and health, protect the welfare of children born from ART, and avoid putting off difficult ethical questions for the future. 147 In any case, regulation in the U.S. must keep in mind the rapid pace of technology development and reflect the individual nature of infertility treatment.
III. RESULTS: THE IMPACT OF CROSS-ATLANTIC DISCOURSE
A. REGULATORY PARADIGM SHIFTS?
The U.K. model for regulating ART is mature: comprehensive, unified, and heavy handed. The U.S. model is in its infancy: haphazard, decentralized, and 143 Id. at 1061. 144 
Id.
145
See Carson, supra note 139. deferential to autonomous decisions by professionals and consumers. Despite the calls to emulate the U.K. model in the U.S., we predict that the U.S. system is unlikely to follow the path of the HFEA. Instead, differing cultural values and U.S. Constitutional guarantees will drive a uniquely U.S. solution which focuses at a federal level on quality control and consumer protection, leaving ethical and moral line-drawing to individual patients, providers, and professional medical bodies.
To be sure, the U.K.'s model of central control over artificial reproduction has some significant advantages over the patchwork of U.S. state and federal regulation that essentially leave the U.S. fertility industry unregulated. U.K. consumers have access to better information about individual clinics and providers. They are better protected from unscrupulous practices of unethical providers who have made headlines and eroded confidence in the U.S. system. The benefits to consumers translate to confidence in a system that allows the HFEA to answer difficult ethical questions and draw uniform lines applicable across the U.K. This model eliminates the public hand wringing and debate that dominate U.S. discourse on human reproduction.
That said, the wholesale importation of the U.K. model to the U.S. is neither possible nor wise given the American values, history, and culture. The U.K. system does not accommodate the moral diversity that exists in the U.S., where profound disagreement over the moral status of the embryo exists. The current systemcomprised of oversight by professional groups, sporadic state regulation, and significant deference to individual consumer choice-although imperfect, allows for moral diversity on ethical and policy issues. Any attempt to impose national uniformity in the absence of moral consensus over ART policies will monopolize precious time on the national docket (as the ongoing battle over stem cell research for therapeutic purposes demonstrates), and is unlikely to resolve the ethical dilemmas. Rules imposed in the U.S. by an HFEA-type regulatory body appointed by an executive elected by a bare majority of the population would face fierce court challenges and political opposition.
A second reason for expecting less federal-and more state and privateactivity around ART issues in the U.S. is politics. The lack of national moral consensus has made federal policy making extremely difficult, since no set of advocates has been able to assemble a stable majority coalition to support their views and enact legislation and financial support consistent with them. As a result, federal influence over many ART policies has been limited. Since advocates of different views are not evenly distributed geographically, however, individual states have frequently been able to implement their own, widely divergent, policies in place to deal with at least some ART issues.
This pattern of "federalism by default" is perhaps most clear in the debate over embryonic stem cell research. Despite considerable attention to these issues over the course of the last fifteen years by two separate Presidentially appointed bioethics commissions and several different scientific advisory panels, as well as considerable Congressional discussion, there is little consensus about the appropriate scope and financing for this research.
148 Debate in Washington has generally not addressed the permissibility or legality of embryonic stem cell research, but has rather focused on the narrower question of what stem cell "lines" should be eligible to receive federal financial support through the National Institutes of Health and other federal agencies. 149 The use of federal funds to create embryos for research purposes or to destroy embryos has been routinely prohibited in appropriations bills since the mid1990s through the so-called Dickey amendment.
150 Subsequent debate, however, has relied on arguments that this prohibition does not extend to research using stem cell lines created with other funding sources. 151 The Clinton Administration advocated an expansive view of this argument, which would have encouraged researchers to fund the creation of stem cell lines from other sources and then apply for federal funds to continue research on these "pre-existing" lines. 152 The Bush Administration, by contrast, has limited federal funding support to the small number of lines existing before 2001, although the precise legal status of this directive is unclear. 153 The House recently passed legislation that would expand federal support to cell lines derived from embryos created, but not used, for in vitro fertilization. The Bush Administration has threatened to veto this bill, and as of this writing it is unclear if the veto can be overridden.
156
In short, federal policy toward embryonic stem cells has been inconsistent and uncertain. Current federal law imposes no restrictions on research funded by private or other non-federal funds, but limits federal support to a small number of preexisting lines. 157 This limited federal activity has led both supporters and detractors of embryonic stem cell research to seek favorable state legislation on the allowable scope of such research.
158 It has also encouraged disease advocates and researchers to seek less restrictive funding from state and private sources.
159
The resulting state legislation and other activities governing ART technologies have been extremely diverse in scope and intent, ranging from legislation to prohibit and even criminalize certain types of activities, to actively encouraging embryonic stem cell research within state borders and authorizing considerable amounts of state funds to support such research. 160 While no state has enacted anything approaching an HFEA-style comprehensive regulatory framework, it is significant that states have found it easier to legislate in this complex and controversial area than the federal government.
State financial support for stem cell research is particularly significant, since few states have any experience with supporting bio-medical research on a large scale. While some states have supported various kinds of targeted research initiatives at state universities in order to encourage other types of technology, 161 almost no states have experience with operating competitive, peer-reviewed research programs in medicine or genetic research. Funding from the National Institutes of Health and other federal agencies has been ubiquitous in biomedical research, so states have not previously felt compelled to support research in these areas.
In spite of this limited experience, several states have approved, and more have proposed, substantial spending from state sources to support stem cell research. California's voter approved initiative, known as Proposition 71, intends to disburse $3 billion in research funds over ten years. 162 While this is clearly the largest undertaking to date, New Jersey, Illinois, Connecticut, and Massachusetts have also approved stem cell research programs, and similar programs have been proposed in Wisconsin, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, among others. 163 While the enacted and proposed programs differ in particulars, most envision states spending hundreds of millions of dollars to support research with fewer restrictions than currently applied by federal funding agencies. The arguments in support of these undertakings are as much about economic development and jobs as science. In addition to noting the potential of stem cell research to provide therapy for a wide range of conditions, advocates have also stressed the potential to create jobs and income for state residents and the need to "keep up" with other states and retain scientists and state prestige. A letter from a leading stem cell researcher to a Wisconsin state legislator provides a useful example of this rhetoric:
I was born and grew up in the Midwest, but subsequently studied both on the east and west coasts. I therefore know first hand that there is a strong impression on both coasts that the middle of the country is an intellectual void. If a T.V. sitcom takes place in either L.A. or New York, and the writers want to introduce a character that is a wellmeaning yokel, they often put a T-shirt on him with "Wisconsin" printed on the front to establish his character. It has been a great source of pride to me that the publicity surrounding human embryonic stem cells and its universal association with Wisconsin has helped to remove that T-shirt. Please be absolutely clear: any legislation that impacts basic science that is more restrictive than current federal legislation will only help put that T-shirt back on.
164
The perception by state policy makers that they are in competition with other states for jobs, scientists, and prestige-in much the same way as they compete for other economic development activities-will probably produce a level of spending on stem cell research significantly higher than if federal policy on allowable cell lines was less restrictive and funding levels were established through the budget process at the National Institutes of Health. In addition to the $3 billion passed in California, 165 Illinois proposed a $1 billion bond issue, 166 New Jersey is planning a $500 million initiative, 167 Pennsylvania put forward a $500 million spending plan, 168 Wisconsin proposed a $375 million initiative, 169 and Connecticut approved a $100 million spending plan. 170 Even if all of these funds are not spent, it would appear that embryonic stem cells may well receive more funding from state agencies than less controversial stem cell research currently receives from federal agencies.
The ability of state agencies to implement these ambitious undertakings is an open question, since states have little history with managing large-scale research enterprises. States attempting to establish stem cell research programs confront two separate but related classes of administrative and political problems. One set of such problems would occur even if the research subject were less controversial. 171 The argument in this paragraph is largely drawn from Noll, supra note 153. grants in order to establish large-scale, peer-reviewed research enterprises. These procedures must address such questions as conflicts of interest between reviewers and potential grantees, and the potential conflict between the blind nature of most academic review processes and the requirements of state open meeting laws. States must also establish intellectual property guidelines governing who "owns" products and processes developed through funded research, and who receives revenues from their licensing and sale. Federal law allows academic institutions to keep licensing revenues from products developed with federal financial support in order to encourage the commercialization of research results.
172
State policy makers, however, are likely to insist that a significant share of licensing revenues flow to the state rather than to universities. While none of these problems is insurmountable, it will likely take non-negligible amounts of time for states to negotiate agreements and put procedures into place.
A second, more severe set of potential problems stems from the controversial nature of embryonic stem cell research and its connection to the politically difficult abortion issue. While the debate over embryonic stem cell research is less polarized than the abortion controversy (some pro-life supporters such as the Ronald Reagan family have supported stem cell research, and some pro-choice groups have opposed it 173 ) it is also true that most of the opposition, both in the states and in Washington, has come from groups that are also pro-life. 174 Such groups are likely to resort to a wide range of legal and political means to stall or stop state funded stem cell activities on an on-going basis. This suggests embryonic stem cell research is likely to remain controversial, and a potential issue in state elections. 175 There is limited history by which to judge the potential severity of these problems and the ability of state policy-makers to overcome them. However, the little evidence that is available suggests that both types of problems may impede state efforts to establish functioning stem cell research programs. California's efforts to implement Proposition 71, the first such state sponsored stem cell program, has been preoccupied with research management, litigation by pro-life groups to prevent the state from issuing bonds to support the research, and other start-up questions.
176
In similar fashion, the New Jersey initiative has had to deal with disagreements over spending priorities, methods for project selection, and other research management questions. 177 A planned state bond issue has been postponed until after the 2006 election for fear of creating a conservative backlash against the program.
178
In contrast to the regulation of unresolved moral issues surrounding ART, increased U.S. regulation of data collection and quality control is consistent with U.S. values and the country's history in dealing with reproduction and medical 172 Id.
173
See Andrews, supra note 8. to a woman of less than 40 years of age. Women aged 40 and over may receive a maximum of three eggs or embryos. 213 According to the HFEA, limits on embryo implantations reflect current medical thinking and help avoid serious health risks. 214 In the U.S., on the other hand, no regulations govern the number of implantations an infertility clinic may perform per IVF cycle. In the absence of regulations, however, the practice committee of the ASRM 215 issued "Guidelines on Number of Embryos Transferred," a series of recommendations regarding limits on embryo transfers. 216 Unlike the British Code of Practice, the ASRM guidelines are voluntary, although SART members must follow them, according to their membership requirements.
In addition, the ASRM recommendations, unlike the HFEA regulations, account for the prognosis of the woman receiving embryo transfers. 217 The authors of the guidelines reject general restrictions like the British regulations because "[s]trict limitations on the number of embryos transferred as required by law in some countries, do not allow treatment plans to be individualized after careful consideration of each patient's own unique circumstances." 218 For women under age 35 with sufficient embryos for cryopreservation, the ASRM recommends that no more than two good quality embryos be implanted. 219 This number increases from 3 to 4 and 5 depending on the age of the woman and the status of the available embryos. 220 The guidelines further provide that "additional embryos may be transferred according to individual circumstances" for patients "with two or more failed IVF cycles." 221 According to the 1998 CDC report, age is the most important factor influencing live birth rate when a woman uses her own eggs. 222 The ASRM report takes into account the importance of age, as well as embryo quality, cryopreservation opportunities, and the potential for new techniques. 223 
